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Abstract
This article uses the first domestic violence case filed against the United States in the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to discuss the politics of
gender and domestic violence. We discuss how gender-neutral frameworks of the case
in the U.S. ignore the interpersonal gender and power issues which often attend
domestic violence cases. The case before the IACHR was arguably more successful in
addressing gender by drawing from the human rights literature on women’s rights.
However, given that this case is the first human rights charge against the United
States by a domestic violence survivor, the specifically gendered framework and
unique nature of the crime could be potentially limiting for other domestic violence
cases. We conclude by offering an alternative framework for domestic violence
intervention in human rights cases.
Key Words
Domestic Violence, Women’s Rights, Feminist Theory, United States

By all accounts, Jessica Gonzales followed the correct
protocol in alerting law enforcement when she feared for her
daughters’ safety. Jessica obtained a restraining order to protect
herself and her three daughters from her estranged husband Simon,
who had been acting erratically since their separation. On June 22,
1999, Simon picked up the girls at 5:15pm, and she was subsequently
unable to reach him throughout the night. Jessica called the police
four times and went to the police station in person at 12:40am. The
dispatchers repeatedly told her that Simon had not violated the
restraining order despite her fears that her daughters were in danger,
because he had legal visitation rights to the children. One dispatcher
went so far as to say ‘that’s a little ridiculous making us freak out and
thinking the kids are gone’ (Lenahan v. United States 2010:19). At
3:20am, Simon pulled up to the Castle Rock, Colorado Police Station
and opened fire. He was killed in the shootout and officers found the
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bodies of Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales shot to death in the
back of Simon’s truck (Lenahan v. United States 2010).
Following her daughters’ murders, Jessica Gonzales (now
Jessica Lenahan) sued the town of Castle Rock, the police department,
and three individual officers for failure to adequately enforce her
restraining order. Both the U.S. District Court of Colorado and the
U.S. Supreme Court argued that the Castle Rock Police Department
and the town of Colorado had exercised due diligence in response to
the information Gonzales provided that night and, therefore, had no
reason to believe that Simon was a threat to his children. Following
these two cases, Gonzales, along with the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Human Rights Clinic, brought a petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (henceforth IACHR),
making it the first individual complaint of a human rights violation
against the United States by a domestic violence survivor (Lenahan v.
United States 2010).
Calling the Gonzales case ‘the first human rights case by a
survivor of domestic violence,’ invokes a specific image of the
‘survivor.’ Arlene Roberts of The Huffington Post (2009) describes the
familiar domestic violence narrative:
The unfortunate saga has played out one too many
times. A young woman, fearing for her life at the
hands of a spouse or live-in companion, seeks
protection from law enforcement officials by
obtaining an order of protection. However, the
restraining order is not enforced and those
intended for protection meet with a tragic end.
This is a story about a specific gendered victim who ‘met a tragic end:’
a woman experiencing physical, emotional, sexual, and/or economic
abuse and control by her intimate partner.
Statistics consistently show that abuse is a common
experience for American women (NISVS 2010; Tjaden and Thoennes
2000). Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Deputy Director of the Columbia
Law Clinic, adds that the ‘Jessica Gonzales’ tragedy is by no means
unique’ (2008:187). However, due to the extreme nature of this case,
one could also maintain that it is, in fact, not ‘typical.’ We argue that
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using the Gonzales case as a potential model for human rights may
limit future national and international response to domestic violence
claims because it is not representative of the majority of women’s
experiences of battering in the United States. Additionally, this case
and its framework follow the historical framing of domestic violence
claims making legitimated by a woman’s status in the family.
In the United States, women are thought to have rights that
are no different from men. Women can make justice claims before the
law, which is assumed to be impartial and unbiased. However, history
has shown how women have been excluded from accessing certain
rights. Human rights activists have fought to distinguish women’s
rights as a specific kind of human rights through the creation of the
Committee to End Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and
United Nations-sponsored conferences in Vienna, Cairo, and Beijing.
Women have human rights, but those rights are gendered (Merry
2006). The Gonzales cases in domestic courts and the IACHR
illustrate these different understandings of women and rights. In U.S.
courts, the main issue at hand was not violence against women per se,
but, rather, the gender-neutral relationship of the private citizen to the
state. The case at the IACHR focused on Gonzales’ status as a mother
and her right to protect her children (Lenahan v. United States 2010).
That is, the case before the IACHR conceptualized womanhood in a
specific way and subsequent discussions privileged the relationship
between women and the family and women and children. This article
uses the Gonzales case as an entrée into discussions of the United
States’ and human rights frameworks of domestic violence through
gendered or gender-neutral claims.
We begin with a review of shared critiques of liberalism and
‘moral personhood’ by Western feminist scholars and feminist
scholars of human rights. These scholars argue that seemingly
gender-neutral assumptions underlie political doctrines and social
resources, and that these assumptions prevent the full realization of
women’s rights. We then examine human rights advocates’ proposals
of a gendered notion of rights and personhood, as a corrective to the
gender-neutral frameworks which limit women’s access to resources.
We conclude by examining the potential limits of both frameworks,
and call for reconfiguration of gendered personhood in the United
States and question the utility of such an atypical domestic violence
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case in the IACHR. We argue that conceptualizing human rights
discourses and the law as cultural products that can shift and change –
rather than unmoving and stable entities – allows for a more agentic
understanding of how women and organizations can deploy rights
frameworks in order to make positive social change (Merry 2006).
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION:
THE GONZALES CASE
‘Women’s’ issues such as rape in war, human trafficking, and
female genital cutting are widely considered human rights violations
and are the subject of many human rights campaigns. Domestic
violence, however, has not reached the threshold of a human rights
violation despite its prevalence among women globally (MacKinnon
2006). In the United States, domestic violence is largely
conceptualized as an act of violence perpetrated by an individual,
rather than the state or state actors, thus not reaching the standard of
a human rights violation (Merry 2006).
Jessica Gonzales fought this standard and filed suit against
the town of Castle Rock, Colorado, the Castle Rock Police
Department, and the three individual officers that she had spoken to
throughout the night of her daughters’ disappearance for failure to
enforce her restraining and violation of her due process rights. The
case was dismissed and on appeal, the 10th Circuit Court, sitting en
banc, found subsequent evidence for a procedural due process claim
and but affirmed the District Court of Colorado, that the individual
officers could not be held liable for her daughters’ deaths (Castle Rock
v. Gonzales 2005). When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
10th Circuit Court’s opinion was reversed. As evidenced by the
opinions of the lower and Supreme Courts, the state cannot be held
liable for a violent act committed against an individual (Castle Rock v.
Gonzales 2005).
Despite the conceptualization of violence against women as
an individual problem rather than a cultural one in the United States,
the statistics paint a different picture. The United States has among
the highest rates in the industrial world for rape, domestic violence,
and spousal murder. Between 25 to 50 percent of all women over the
age of 18 will experience domestic violence at some point during their
lives (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). Of all the women murdered in the
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United States, 40 to 50 percent of them were killed by a husband or
boyfriend (Campbell et al. 2003). Despite these staggering numbers,
the United States is rarely discussed as a state that needs human rights
intervention (Armaline, Glasberg and Purkayastha 2011). Part of the
reason why the United States and its’ citizens may fail to conceptualize
domestic violence as a human rights violation may be due to the
privileging of gender-neutral discourses over discussions that
foreground gendered inequalities as connected to violence against
women.
In the last twenty years, however, domestic violence has
become one of the key organizing issues around which activists and
scholars rally that women’s rights are human rights (Bunch 1990).
This issue specifically indexes the key critiques of liberalism, as
domestic violence is often considered private and individual rather
than systemic and group-based. Human rights activist Charlotte
Bunch demonstrates this viewpoint, arguing that:
Significant numbers of the world’s population are
routinely subject to torture, starvation, terrorism,
humiliation, mutilation, and even murder simply
because they are female. Crimes such as these
against any group other than women would be
recognized as a civil and political emergency as
well as a gross violation of the victims’ humanity.
Yet, despite a clear record of deaths and
demonstrable abuse, women’s rights are not
commonly classified as human rights (1990:486).
Bunch also notes that no matter women’s differences by race, class,
sexuality, age, or ablebodiness, violence is a common experience of
women throughout the world, constituting a grave violation of their
human rights to life and liberty (1990:489). Following the lead of their
non-Western counterparts, scholars in the United States have begun
to theorize about the utility of the current frameworks for domestic
violence intervention (Stark 2007; Libal and Parekh 2009). For
example, Evan Stark (2007) critiques the prevailing ‘protect and
punish’ model of domestic violence intervention for its lack of
attention to structural causes of widespread violence against women.
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He argues that domestic violence can be molded to fit the dominant
liberal notion of personhood by focusing on the ways in which
systematic violence against women restricts women’s access to the
rights and resources of citizens. However, the only legislation to
directly address the structural underpinnings of domestic violence
against women – CEDAW – continues to flounder in Congress. The
individual-level approach utilized in the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) remains the only mechanism of civil redress for battered
women in the United States.
Liberalism: Feminist and Human Rights Critiques
Liberalism is the political philosophy which underlies many
modern democracies. According to liberalism, a person is
conceptualized as bound, autonomous, and self-determining. The
relationship between the state and the individual is characterized by a
social contract in which the individual allows the state particular rights
and thus the state is granted power over individuals through the social
contract. The liberal individual is a contentious assumption. Feminist
and human rights scholars argue that politically liberal assumptions of
personhood exclude marginalized people, as individuals or as groups,
from accessing rights. These critiques of liberalism are shared by
Western feminist scholars across many disciplines as well as scholars
in the human rights literature. Western feminists highlight the
masculinist, raced and classed underpinnings of the liberal person
(Crenshaw 1991; Fraser 1989; hooks 2000; MacKinnon 2006; Roberts
1997). Human rights scholarship points to the liberal person as a
Western construct embodied in human rights discourse which
privileges a particular notion of personhood and favors some rights
over others (Pateman 1988; Pollis and Schwab; MacKinnon 2006;
Stark 2007; Nussbaum 1999; Binion 1995; Jaggar 1983). Many of these
shared critiques center around concerns that an individual may not
identify themselves as an autonomous entity, appeals to rights may be
based on group membership not on a relationship to the state, and
that some rights that people seek are group rights rather than
individual rights (Bulbeck 1998; Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2001;
Gedalof 1999; Merry 2006).
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Law and the United States
For scholars of legal issues in the United States, the liberal
framework is problematic as it is inherently masculine. Feminist
scholars argue that the liberal distinction between the public and
private in U.S. law is one of the key ways in which the state ignores
women’s rights. Fraser (1989) calls the modern state a ‘public
patriarchy’ whereby women can only claim rights when they enter the
public sphere, from which they have historically been excluded.
However, the ways in which women routinely interact with the state
and state-run institutions forms a second-tiered and disadvantaged
system of subjecthood: women are conceptualized as dependent and
not as ’ rights bearing beneficiaries …[and] possessive
individuals’ (Fraser 1989:153). This separation of public and private,
many argue, is what allows law enforcement to disregard women’s
rights by dismissing or policing them. Until recently, police officers
would not respond the same way to domestic violence as other types
of assault because it was considered a ‘private family matter’ (Sack
2004; Binion 1995; Peter 2006). Rape has also been conceptualized as
a private act, out of the purview of state responsibility, which invites
pathologizing, victim-blaming rhetoric, and individual-level
explanations in lieu of structural analyses and solutions (MacKinnon
1989).
When women do enter the criminal justice system, they are
often treated differently because of gendered understandings about
domestic life. Chesney-Lind and Pasko (2004) find that young women
are more likely to encounter the criminal justice system for crimes
such as running away, and are often treated more ‘lenient’ sentences
such as house arrest. This is a flawed approach as many of these ‘runaways’ leave home because of violence or abuse, and are then
punished with a return to an abusive home life.
Identity and Agency
Liberalism assumes a bounded, static, and rational subject,
which many feminists argue is problematically masculine. They argue
that women have different relationships which form their identity and
agency in different ways than men. Some early psychological work
(Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982) argues that women’s identities are
other-oriented and are less bound and individualistic than men’s
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identity. Sex-difference theorists (Irigaray 1985, 1992) argue that
women biologically and culturally share the universal qualities of the
feminine: the fluid, leaky, nurturing, etc. The liberal assumptions of
personhood as autonomous, bounded, and rational, then, do not
match up to women’s identities which are much more communal and
other-oriented.
The work of feminist psychologists and sex difference
theorists has been heavily critiqued by those who argue that identity
and agency are formed in relationship to social structure. Collins
(1990) argues that black women have a history of matriarchy and
orientation to the community rather than to an individual. Racialized
and classed positions create structural inequalities that constrain some
women’s ability to act effectively in political and social spheres that
privilege white and upper-middle class persons (hooks 2000; Roberts
1997; Crenshaw 1991). These scholars agree that assumptions of
bounded and rational individuals in social and political thought
marginalize women, though they argue that non-white and lower class
women are at a greater disadvantage, and that the root cause of the
marginalization is structural rather than something essential (either
biological or psychological about womanhood).
Gedolf (1999) argues that assumptions of the autonomous
bounded individual are not the best framework to analyze rights,
rights claims, or identity. This is not to enforce an essentialized notion
of women as less rational nor a perspective of sex difference as
women being organically more fluid than men. Instead, Gedolf
advocates for a contextualized and structural understanding of
women’s identity and positionality (1999). In the same vein, cultural
feminists argue that we must attend to the ‘situated-ness’ of women
within culture and structure in order to understand how women’s
identities are formed. These scholars argue that the human rights
discourse fails to capture the rights of groups or the experience of the
individual that cannot be divorced from group positioning. These
critics argue that the prevailing human rights doctrine staunchly
subscribes to the notion that autonomous individuals are the
possessors of rights, rather than individuals with fluid identities and
multiple ties, or groups of people.
There are obvious linkages between the gendered critiques of
human rights and the critiques of human rights by non-Western
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scholars. The critiques include the privileging of civil and political
rights over social cultural and economic, assuming the existence of
particular political structures, and conceptualizing personhood,
agency, and identity in Western ways (see Brems 1997 for a review on
feminist and cultural critiques of human rights). Non-Western
feminists argue that women are not bounded individuals; that agency
and identity are more fluid and porous, and human rights frameworks
fail to capture the relational qualities of personhood (Bulbeck 1998;
Gedalolf 1999). The separation between public and private is not only
seen as privileging men’s access to human rights instruments and
enforcement. It also imposes a Western framework onto states,
communities, and cultures that do not define personhood as an
autonomous, bounded individual (Pateman 1988; MacKinnon 2006;
Stark 2007; Nussbaum 1999; Binion 1995; Jaggar 1983).
These notions of what constitutes an individual and who may
have rights and who does not, are intensely debated between
advocates of cultural relativists and universalist approaches to human
rights issues. If human rights are indeed universal, then that allows for
the authors and enforcers of those rights to privilege some rights over
others. The debates between cultural relativism and universalism have
been cast in very stark terms, and those social scientists who stand
resolutely on one side or another have been critiqued by feminists
who argue that there is certainly a more nuanced and coherent way to
look at the relationship between individual and group’s rights and
power.
Law and Rights as Culture
Perhaps the best entre’ into the tensions between rights and
the law is to understand that human rights and the law are both
culturally situated discourses. While culture is usually seen in the
Western world as backward, anti-feminist, and opposing human
rights, some scholars have argued that we must understand legal and
rights frameworks as themselves cultural products (Coomaraswamy
2001; Cowan, Debor and Wilson 2001; Merry 1990; 2006). Culture, in
this instance is a process of meaning making which is dynamic,
contested, unbounded and interpretable (Cowan, Debor and Wilson
2001; Merry 1990; 2006).
This view of both rights and law as cultural discourse allows
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for a critical interrogation of power at multiple levels and allows for a
conceptualization of both individual and/or group agency. This
perspective acknowledges that ‘human rights are socially
constructed and…are rooted in political, economic, and cultural
power relations’ (Coomaraswamy 2001:13). But we should also
recognize that people may take up particular legal and or rights
discourses to make their claims successful (Polletta 2006; Merry 1990;
2006). While certainly not all people have the same access to particular
claims, there is certainly creative room that groups or individuals may
deploy to challenge or broaden notions of what is a human right and
what constitutes a legal claim. Merry argues that people develop a
‘legal consciousness’ through their understandings of their selfhood,
moral order, and culture (1990; 2006). For human rights frameworks
to be successfully adopted, Merry finds that people must 1) be willing
to take up the framework, 2) have that framework and or their claims
recognized by powerful institutions and 3) be able to translate the
framework in ways that are meaningful on the ground (Merry 2006).
‘WOMAN AS…’: PERSONHOOD, RIGHTS AND THE CASE
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
While scholars have argued that women’s ability to access
rights has been restricted by the seemingly gender-neutral tenants of
liberalism, gendered scripts are key to accessing institutional and
judicial resources (Hamilton 2010). A brief historical analysis reveals
that women have strategically used gendered identities in order to
make positive social change. The history of domestic violence
activism in the United States provides examples of the changing
definitions of women’s personhood and subsequent access to rights
from the state. In the United States, women have only been able to
access freedom from systematic violence if they inhabit a certain
status: woman as wife, mother, worker, etc. In many cases, this was a
strategic decision in order to secure funding or increase political
viability. We show how these strategic deployments of identity are
used agentically to access rights and to make legal changes. However,
we recognize that the gendered scripts may be limited in terms of
which women may readily access and successfully deploy them.

© Sociologists

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss1/3

~61~
Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

10

Missari and Zozula: ‘Woman As…’: Personhood, Rights and The Case of Domestic Violence

S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73

Woman as Wife
Even though the term ‘domestic violence’ is relatively new,
intimate partner violence has a long history in the United States. In
the 18th century, church courts would decide on cases of rape or
domestic violence, almost always preferring to keep the family
together (Pleck 1987). ‘Good’ wives were those who stayed with their
husbands, no matter how severe the beatings. Despite the submission
of personal integrity to the sanctity of the family, early colonial law
acknowledged marital violence and passed the first laws prohibiting it.
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony passed one such law against wife beating that stated, ‘Everie
marryed woeman shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by
her husband, unlesse it be in his owne defence upon her
assault’ (Pleck 1987:21-22). The 19th century brought increased
activism against wife beating. Both the feminist and temperance
movements saw wife beating as a social problem. Whereas the
temperance movement saw alcohol as the root cause, feminists saw
the hierarchical structure of marriage and divorce laws as the chief
facilitator of violence against women (Schneider 2000). The discourse
of wife beating as a symptom of alcoholism became the dominant
frame, and shelters for wives of alcoholics were created.
Woman as Mother
Through the rest of the 19th and early 20th century, the
critique of patriarchal marriage subsided and the first formal social
agencies to deal with family violence were created, primarily as aid to
children. Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCCs)
were founded by members of the upper class and were often used as
places of refuge for women experiencing domestic violence, who
would gain entry by making claims as mothers in the name of safety
for their children. SPCCs served a secondary purpose as well. They
were largely a mechanism of social control of ‘disorderly’ immigrant
families who were a threat to middle class values and national stability
(Gordon 1988) Domestic violence was one of the many problems
associated with poor immigrant communities warranting formal
intervention.
Despite formal intervention (albeit, indirectly), many women
remained ambivalent about the individual ‘right’ to freedom from
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violence throughout this period. Given the choice of protesting
beatings and being left homeless with no source of income, many
women chose to stay with abusive husbands. It was not until (certain)
women had the possibility independence from their husband through
outside employment, divorce and remarriage, birth limitation, and
government aid to single mothers did the concept of the entitlement
to freedom from violence become realized (Gordon 1988:256).
Woman as Worker
It was not until 1971 that the first shelter dedicated solely to
aiding battered women opened in the United States. The shelter
movement of the 1970s paved the way for discussions of the scope of
the problem of domestic violence and the need for federal
intervention. Initial discussions of a national domestic violence policy
were initiated in 1990 when the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) was introduced by then Senator Joseph Biden. In the
following years, feminist organizations, along with a coalition of civil
rights and worker’s rights groups organized to lobby Congress in
favor of the Act (Gelb 2003).
The Commerce Clause, which grants federal intervention into
any activity that obstructs interstate commerce, was utilized in VAWA
after four years of witness testimony and data gathering that
sufficiently demonstrated the effect of violence on women’s ability to
participate fully in the national economy as workers and consumers.
Statistics show that homicide is the leading cause of death for women
at work, almost half of all victims of rape lose their jobs, and batterers
frequently harass their partners at work (Goldscheid 2000:116-117).
Reports also state that gender-based violence not only costs millions
in health-care costs per year but costs employers an estimated $3 to $5
billion as a result of absenteeism due to domestic violence annually
(Biden 2000:22). The use of women’s roles as workers and consumers
is the first alternative to the traditional wife or mother frame for
claimsmaking, by privileging the relationship of the ungendered but
productive citizen to the state.
Certainly the roles of a woman as a mother and the toll that
domestic violence takes on children’s lives are important issues to
discuss. We briefly cite these examples to show how central
relationships are to the notion of womanhood, and to argue that the
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provision of such evidence comes from a structured history of how
women’s rights are mobilized in the United States. This trend is
potentially harmful and limiting to policy
JESSICA GONZALES: GENDER NEUTRAL OR PRIVILEGED
WOMANHOOD?
Domestic Cases
Jessica Gonzales’ motherhood is central to the symbolic
resonance of her case, since her daughters were the primary victims of
her husband’s violence. Despite this, the arguments made by her
lawyers at the state and federal level are surprisingly absent of
gendered issues. These issues include the state’s duty to enforce
restraining orders, the duty of the state to protect citizens against
private acts, and due process. In her U.S. Supreme Court case,
Gonzales’ attorneys argued that her right to equality under the law was
violated because the lack of enforcement of her restraining order,
which follows the historic pattern of inadequate or non-response of
police officers in domestic violence calls.
The issue of state responsibility has also been central to the
limits of the duty of law enforcement’s to protect private citizens from
violence. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(1989), state responsibility for protecting private citizens was deemed
conditional, even when the state has had some level of prior
knowledge of potential risk of violence. The facts of DeShaney are as
follows. Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney, who was hospitalized after
his father beat him, was released to his father’s custody three days
after leaving the hospital. The case against his father was subsequently
dismissed, but the Department of Social Services checked in on
Joshua and his father multiple times from 1983 and 1984, in which no
action was taken despite suspicion of continued abuse. In March of
1984, Joshua’s father beat him so badly that Joshua suffered extensive
brain damage leaving him permanently disabled. Even though the
Department of Social Services was monitoring the family at the time
of Joshua’s abuse, the court ruled that the state did not have any
‘affirmative duty’ to protect Joshua as he was not technically under
state custody at the time of his beating. The majority opinion held that
‘[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge
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of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to
help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his
freedom to act on his behalf’ (DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services 1989). Similarly, the existence of a
restraining order in the Gonzales cases failed to meet the ‘special
relationship’ requirement, adding that such a ruling could result in a
landslide of public expectations of the enforcement of private citizen’s
rights (Combs 2006).
This gender neutral language in determining the relationship
between the state and the citizen, and the duties attached is markedly
different from the emotional language in documents provided to the
IACHR. We argue that the absence of the recognition of the gendered
nature of the majority of domestic violence cases in the United States
hinders the ability of the state to responsibly enforce domestic
violence law and not be subject to more general (and overexaggerated) issues of private citizens’ rights.
IACHR and Womanhood
In the case before the IACHR, Gonzales’ counsel claimed
that her right to special protection for mothers and children (as
stipulated in Article VII of the American Declaration) was violated.
Additionally, petitioners claimed that the United States violated
Gonzales’ right to due process by failing to protect her daughters
from domestic violence and their inadequate investigation of her
daughter’s murders (Lenahan v. United States 2010). For example, an
amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of Gonzales concludes with
the following statement:
By failing to protect women from violence and
hold their batters accountable the United States
flouts the American Declaration and basic
precepts of international law which secure the
right to life and to family life (Chaudior 2008:32).
The consequences of failure to enforce Gonzales’ restraining order
may be implicitly read into this conclusion: Gonzales lost the right to
‘family life.’ Omitted are other notions of human rights which are
certainly violated when we conceptualize domestic violence as a
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human rights violation.
It is important to note that among the seven claims against
the United States, the IACHR could not find sufficient evidence to
conclude that the U.S. violated: the ‘Right to protection of honor,
personal reputation and private and family life’ (Article V) and ‘Right
to a family and to protection thereof (Article VI) (Organization of
American States 1948). It is important to contrast this with Article
VII: ‘Right to protection for mothers and children,’ which the United
States violated. In this example, the specifically gendered conception
of the rights of mothers and children were upheld, while the genderneutral right to protection was not.
The Gonzales case leaves domestic violence and human rights
activists with several questions to be explored. First, how can
challenges to existing laws incorporate a gendered picture of a person,
without automatically assuming wife and motherhood as the primary
relationship that legitimates attention from state and international
bodies? Furthermore, how do we incorporate a gendered
understanding of personhood which would help us frame women’s
rights as human rights? These questions should be confronted when
shaping future policy and we suggest that the potential for an
alternative construction exists within the human rights framework
DISCUSSION
As stated above, feminists have vigorously debated the utility
of liberal personhood for the realization of human rights as women’s
rights (Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999). One of the most widely used
critiques argues that liberalism largely ignores the private sphere,
where the state has historically had a policy of nonintervention. In
contrast to this, in the documents submitted to the IACHR, the
complainant is framed as a woman very much situated in her
relationships. While the Gonzales case has been touted as the first
individual complaint of a human rights violation against the United
States by a domestic violence survivor, it certainly follows the historic
pattern of highlighting women’s roles as mothers and wives, instead of
women as citizens. While this may be a strategic tactic on the part of
the ACLU, we argue that this choice of a test case has the potential to
discursively and political exclude women who are not mothers, as well
as women who suffer from domestic violence in relationships that are
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outside of marriage (e.g. as partners in heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual,
trans or queer relationships, or with an abuser who is not an intimate
sexual partner).
At the same time, we find the continued presumption of a
neutral citizen in legalese also problematic. In arguments about the
reformation of laws in the United States to provide adequate
protection, the privileged relationship is between the state and the
citizen, and the citizen with another citizen. The citizen has
historically had a male face (and body) which serves as the default for
determining which rights are ‘special’ (MacKinnon 2006). The utter
absence of a gendered notion of personhood could be potentially
problematic in that it does not take into account power differentials.
Too often, enforcement of laws in domestic violence situations are
predicated on the individual discretion of the police, judges, and social
service workers. Failure to account for how gender stereotypes and
institutionalized sexism play into differential enforcement of domestic
violence laws leaves us with an unhealthy concept of domestic
violence as indistinguishable from other acts of violence committed
by one private citizen against another.
How then, can we integrate an understanding of gender into
the United States legal discourse? How then, can we create a discourse
in the United States and internationally, which does not equate a
women with a particular identity which excludes women without
children, women who are not married, women who suffer from
violence that is not as sensational as Jessica Gonzales.
For these answers, we return to our discussion of law as a
cultural discourse. In the United States, the discourse of human rights
violations tends to be focused on what’s happening ‘out there’ rather
than ‘in our own backyard’ (Armaline, Glasberg, Pukayastha 2011). To
develop a human rights consciousness requires a cultural shift in terms
of how we see ourselves. We argue that this cultural shift could start
with the United States signing the Convention to Eliminate
Discrimination Against Women. Such an institutional and structural
level shift allows for a consciousness and a utility of claims-making. At
the macro-level, it also provides an institutionalized ‘check’ on the
United States by other nations and by non-governmental
organizations.
Having an institutionalized record of a commitment to
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women’s rights means that rights-consciousness and the access to
recourse may be strengthened. Merry (2006) argues that human rights
are ‘made in the vernacular;’ that broad universal ideas about rights
and identity are tenable when they have discursive power in a local
context. As we see in the brief review of women’s rights in the United
States, groups drew from powerful cultural conceptualizations of
rights to make broad social changes.
For instance, the VAW was drafted on the basis of women as
workers and interstate commerce, but the discursive understanding
and practical deployment of the VAW Act does not draw on these
notions (Missari 2011). The legal basis or state commitment to a
particular set of values may also open up the discussion to rights that
are seemingly excluded from the formal discourse. Falcón (2009)
shows how domestic groups were able to deploy a treaty from the
1960’s to make claims about gendered and racial inequality in issues of
reproductive justice. She found that The Center for Reproductive
Rights was able to use the UN’s review process on the US’s
compliance with the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, which the US ratified in 1994, make rights
claims about women of color’s access to sexual education,
reproductive rights, and sexual health. So then, once a treaty is ratified
or a commitment is made at a national level, groups and concerns
which may have been ignored can draw from both powerful and
recognizable discourses.
Making human rights in the vernacular does not ensure that
all claims will be successful or will as readily conform to gendered
scripts that hold power. We still need a way to understand the
differences and similarities of women in violent relationships. We
have argued previously that while domestic violence is a problem for
all kinds of women, the particular experience of legal access is largely
dependent on class, race, culture and other structured positions. We
argue, as Martha Nussbaum has, that the conception of liberal
personhood frequently used in domestic litigation and legislation is
‘not individualistic enough’ (1999:63) to account for women’s unique
experiences as the primary victims of this type of patterned violence.
Following Nussbaum’s assertion, we argue that the ways in which
domestic violence claims are framed are not individualistic enough, in
both U.S. and international discourse. Therefore, a gender-neutral
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approach ignores women’s experiences as individuals who are
routinely faced with a specific type of violence precisely because they
are women. At the same time, using a specifically gendered approach
ignores women who cannot make claims based on their position
within the traditional heteronormative family, their conceptualization
of their identity, and their structured position which may hinder
access to resources.
CONCLUSION
Despite its recent victory in the IACHR, we do not yet know
if the Gonzales case will have any meaningful effect on the
conceptualization of domestic violence as a human rights violation in
the United States. As we have shown, following the history of
successful intervention, those involved in the case have efficiently
utilized specific rhetorical devices depending on the context: gender
neutral in United States courts and specifically gendered in the
IACHR. However, these two viewpoints have remained distinct in
their approach to justice for survivors of domestic violence and have
yet to come to a mutual point of understanding, where courts,
lawyers, and activists can conceptualize a woman as a gendered person
in a more inclusive sense.
We argue that structural and cultural changes, along with
persistent and consistent action on the ground will allow for more
inclusive modes of domestic violence claims. The ratification of
CEDAW would provide women in the United States with the access
and power to deploy human rights claims in domestic violence
charges. A shift in consciousness from the liberal individual to the
gendered individual will also be crucial. In order to implement this we
follow Nussbaum’s suggestion for the integration of feminist critiques
and the individual dignity of people, regardless of role. Using this
framework, a domestic violence survivor could make claims of a
violation of her human right to bodily integrity as an individual, while
recognizing that this specific type of violence is ‘gendered’ in its
ubiquity in the lives of women regardless of context, culture, and
social position.
With an understanding of human rights and the law as
cultural discourses which can change and shift through interaction
with people and groups, we can proceed to conceptualize a way in
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which woman can make rights claims in meaningful ways. By
understanding women as differentially situated due to class, culture,
nationality, citizenship, and the relationships and identities that are
meaningful to them, then we can shy away from making one grand
claim for what constitutes women’s rights and the violation of those
rights. Understanding that rights consciousness is institutional, and
that state actors must accept the discourses and rights claims as valid,
some institutional changes must be made. In the United States, the
ratification of CEDAW is integral to holding the state accountable for
claims of women’s rights abuses as well as for developing a human
rights consciousness in the United States. We need more people like
Jessica Lenahan to bring their cases to legal institutions claiming
human rights violations. We need a cacophony of women and their
experiences in order to create a multitude of workable, meaningful,
and successful frameworks for ensuring women’s rights.
References
Armaline, William T., Davita Silfen Glasberg and Bandana
Purkayastha. 2011. ‘Introduction: Human Rights in the
United States.’ Pp. 1-6 in Human Rights in Our Own Backyard: Injustice and
Resistance in the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bettinger-Lopez, Caroline. 2008. ‘Jessica Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging
Model for Domestic Violence & Human Rights Advocacy in the United
States.’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 21:183-195.
Biden, Joseph. 2000. ‘The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:
A Defense.’ Harvard Journal of Legislation 37:1-43.
Binion, Gayle. 1995. ‘Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective.’ Human Rights Quarterly
17:509-526.
Brems, Eva. 1997. ‘Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural relativism as Dissident
Voices in Human Rights Discourse.’ Human Rights Quarterly 19:136-164.
Bulbeck, Chilla. 1998. Re-orienting Western Feminisms: Women's Diversity in a Postcolonial
World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bunch, Charlotte. 1990. ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of
Human Rights.’ Human Rights Quarterly 12:486-498.
Campbell, Jacquelyn C. Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Block, Doris
Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Nancy Glass, Judith McFarlane,
Carolyn Sachs, Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich, Susan A. Wilt, Jennifer
Manganello, Xiao Xu, Janet Schollenberger, Victoria Frye, and Kathryn
Laughon. 2003. ‘Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships:
Results From a Multisite Case Control Study.’ American Journal of Public
Health 93:1089-1097.
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, (U.S. Lexis 5214 [2005]).
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 142 [2005]).
~70~
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012

19

Societies Without Borders, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73
Chaudior, Christopher, J. 2008. ‘Petition No P-1490-05 Jessica
Gonzales v United States Brief Amici Curiae in Favor of Petitioner.’
Attorneys for Amici Curia.
Chesney-Lind, Meda and Lisa Pasko. 2004. The Female Offender: Girls, Women and Crime.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Chodorow, Nancy. 1978. The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics
of Empowerment. New York: Routledge.
Combs, Lynn A. 2006. ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Legacy o f C a s t l e
Rock v. Gonzales.’ Hastings Law Journal 58:387-412.
Coomaraswamy, Radhika. 2002. ‘Are Women’s Rights Universal? Re-Engaging the
Local? Meridans: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism 3: 1-18.
Cowan, Jane K. Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson. Eds. 2001. Culture
and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence against Women of Color.’ Stanford Law Review 43:1241-1299.
DeShany v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (U.S. Lexis 1039 [1989]).
Fraser, Nancy. 1989. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Falcón, Sylvia M. 2009. ‘Invoking Human Rights and Transnational Activism in Racial
Justice Struggles at Home: US Antiracist Activists and the UN Committee
to Eliminate Racial Discrimination’ Societies Without Borders 4: 295-316.
Gedalof, Irene. 1999. Against Purity: Rethinking Identity with Indian and Western Feminisms.
London: Routledge.
Gelb, Joyce. 2003. Gender Policies in Japan and the United States: Comparing W o m e n ’ s
Movements, Rights and Politics. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldscheid, Julie. 2000. ‘United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the
Name of Federalism.’ Cornell Law Review 86: 109-139.
Gordon, Linda. 1988. Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence:
Boston 1880-1960. New York: Penguin Books.
Hamilton, Melissa. 2010. Judicial discourses on women's agency in violent
relationships: Cases from California.’ Women Studies International Forum
33:570-578.
Hart, Barbara J. 1992. ‘Parental Abduction and Domestic Violence.’ Minnesota Center
Against Violence & Abuse. Retrieved January 31, 2012 (http://
www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/hart/hart.html).
Hooks, Bell. 2000. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Cambridge, MA: South
End Press.
Irigaray, Luce. 1985. The Speculum of the Other Woman. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Irigaray, Luce. 1992. Je Tu Nous: Towards a Culture of Thinking Difference. New York:
Routledge.
~71~
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss1/3

20

Missari and Zozula: ‘Woman As…’: Personhood, Rights and The Case of Domestic Violence

S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73
Jaggar, Alison. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers.
Lenahan v. United States. 2010. Inter-American Commission on Human R i g h t s .
Report No. 80/11. Case 12.626. Organization of A m e r i c a n S t a t e s .
Retrieved January 22, 2012 (http://www.cidh.org/casos/11.eng.htm).
Lenahan, Jessica. 2008. ‘Protection from Violence is a Human Right.’ A m e r i c a n
Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved December 14, 2008 (http://
blog.aclu.org/2008/10/22/protection-from-domestic-violence-is-a-humanright/)
Libal, Kathryn and Serena Parekh. 2009. ‘Reframing violence against women as a
human rights violation: Evan Stark’s Coercive Control.’ Violence against
Women 15: 1477- 1489.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 2006. Are Women Human?: and Other
International Dialogues. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press
Merry, Sally Engle. 1990. Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal
C o n s c i o u s n e s s a m o n g W or ki n g C l a s s A m e r i c an s . C h ic a g o :
University of Chicago Press.
Merry, Sally Engle. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating
International Law into Local Justice. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Missari, Stacy. 2011. ‘The U.S. Culture of Violence.’ Pp. 220-228 in Human Rights in
Our Own Backyard: Injustice and Resistance in the United States, edited by W.
Armaline, D.S. Glasberg, and B.Purkayastha. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press. 220-228.
National Intimate and Partner Sexual Violence Survey. 2010. ‘Summary Report.’
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. Washington: DC. Retrieved January 22, 2012 (http://
www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010- a.pdf).
Nussbaum, Martha. 1999. Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Hare, Ursula. 1999. ‘Realizing Human Rights for Women.’ Human Rights Quarterly
21:364- 402.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1999. ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?’ Pp. 7-25 in Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, edited by Susan Moller Okin. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Organization of American States. 1948. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man. Retrieved March 25, 2012 (www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b3710.html)
Pateman, Carole. 1998. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Peter, Tracey. 2006. ‘Domestic violence in the United States and
Sweden: a welfare state typology comparison within a power r e s o u r c e s
framework.’ Women's Studies International Forum 29:96-107.
Pleck, Elizabeth H. 1987. Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family
Violence from Colonial Times to the Present. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
© Sociologists

~72~
Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012

21

Societies Without Borders, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

S. Missari & C. Zozula/Societies Without Borders 7:1 (2012) 52-73
Polletta, Francesca. 2006. It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pollis, Adamantia and Peter Schwab. 1979. ‘Human Rights: A Western C o n s t r u c t
with Limited Applicability.’ Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives.
New York, Praeger.
Roberts, Arlene M. 2009. ‘Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation.’ The
Huffington Post. Retrieved March 14, 2011 (http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/arlene-m-roberts/domestic-violence-as-ahub_156788.html)
Roberts, Dorothy. 1997. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of
Liberty. New York: Vintage Books.
Sack, Emily J. 2004. ‘Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy.’ Wisconsin Law Review 5:1657-1740.
Stark, Evan. 2007. Coercive control: The entrapment of women in personal life.. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Tjaden, Patricia and Nancy Thoennes. 2000. ‘Full Report of the
Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against
Women: Findings From the National Violence Against Women Survey.’
U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, DC.

Stacy Missari is a graduate student in the sociology department at the
University of Connecticut specializing in gender, sexualities, health,
and human rights. Her dissertation research explores agency at the
individual-level through a quantitative examination of sexual pleasure
and agency among adolescent girls.
Christine Zozula is a graduate student in the sociology department at
the University of Connecticut. Her research interests are crime, deviance, gender and culture. She is currently writing her dissertation, an
ethnography of a Community Court.

© Sociologists

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss1/3

~73~
Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

22

